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Abstract
We document two changes in postwar US macroeconomic dynamics: the pro-
cyclicality of labour productivity vanished, and the relative volatility of employment
rose. We propose an explanation for these changes that is based on reduced hiring
frictions due to improvements in information about the quality of job matches and
the resulting decline in turnover. We develop a simple model with hiring frictions
and variable e¤ort to illustrate the mechanisms underlying our explanation. We
show that our model qualitatively and quantitatively matches the observed changes
in business cycle dynamics.
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1 Introduction
The nature of business cycle uctuations changes over time. There is a host of evi-
dence for changes in the dynamics of postwar US macroeconomic time series (Blanchard
and Watson (1986), McConell and Pérez-Quirós (2000), Stock and Watson (2002), Hall
(2007), Galí and Gambetti (2009)). The present paper documents and discusses two
aspects of these changes. First, the correlation of labour productivity with output or
labour input has declined, by some measures dramatically so.1 Second, the volatility
of labour input measures has increased (relative to that of output).2 Around the same
time as these changes in business cycle dynamics were taking place, there was also a
secular decline in labour market turnover. We seek to investigate the hypothesis that all
three of these changes are linked, and that they reect the US labour market becoming
more exible over this period, which allowed rms to adjust their labour force more
easily in response to various kinds of shocks. Understanding the link between these
three phenomena may shed some light on the nature of some of the structural changes
experienced by the U.S. economy over the past decades, which should of interest to
economists doing research on business cycles, labour markets and other related elds.
In order to illustrate the possible link between a reduction in in labour market fric-
tions and changes in business cycle dynamics, we develop a stylised model of uctuations
with a frictional labour market and investigate how its predictions vary with the level
of labour market turnover. During the 1980s and early 1990s, unemployment in- and
outows in the US fell dramatically.3 The decline in turnover is often interpreted as a
cause for concern that the labour market has become more sclerotic (Davis, Faberman,
1As far as we know, Stiroh (2009) was the rst to provide evidence of a decline in the labour
productivity-hours correlation. Gordon (2010), Barnichon (2010), Galí and Gambetti (2009), and Nucci
and Riggi (2011), using di¤erent approaches, independently investigated the potential sources of that
decline.
2To the best of our knowledge, Galí and Gambetti (2009) were the rst to uncover that nding, but
did not provide the kind of detailed statistical analysis found below. Independently, Hall (2007) o¤ered
some evidence on the size of the decline in employment in the most recent recessions that is consistent
with our nding.
3Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006), Davis (2008), Fallick and Fleischman (2004), Mukoyama
and S¸ahin (2009), Faberman (2017), Davis, Faberman, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2010), Davis,
Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2012), Lazear and Spletzer (2012), Fujita (2018), Cairó and Cajner (2018),
Cairó (2013) and Hyatt and Spletzer (2013), see Cairó and Cajner (2018) for an overview of this litera-
ture.
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Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2010), Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
(2017)), but the opposite is also consistent with the data. Mercan (2017) argues that
improved job search technologies have led to a better functioning labour market, and
shows that this information channelcan explain the decline in employer-to-employer
transitions as well as the decline in turnover between employment and unemployment.
We argue that the decline in turnover may have decreased hiring frictions, because ad-
justment costs in employment are convex. The size of the decline in turnover in the
US is well documented, and we show that the observed decline is su¢ cient to quantita-
tively generate the reduction in frictions needed to explain the changes in labour market
dynamics.
The main intuition for our proposed explanation is straightforward. The idea goes
back to a literature, starting with Oi (1962) and Solow (1964), which attributes the
procyclicality of productivity to variations in e¤ort, resulting in seemingly increasing
returns to labour.4 Suppose that rms have two margins for adjusting their e¤ective
labour input: (observed) employment and (unobserved) e¤ort, which we denote (in logs)
by nt and et, respectively.5 Labour inputs (employment and e¤ort) are transformed into
output according to a standard production function,
yt = (1  )(nt +  et) + at
where at is log total factor productivity and  is a parameter measuring diminishing
returns to labour.
Measured labour productivity, or output per person, is given by
yt   nt =  nt + (1  ) et + at
Labour market frictions make it costly to adjust employment nt. Since these adjustment
4Contributions include studies by Fair (1969), Fay and Medo¤ (1985), Hall (1988), Rotemberg and
Summers (1990), Bernanke and Parkinson (1991), Shapiro (1993), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo
(1993), Bils and Cho (1994), Uhlig and Xu (1996), Basu (1996), Basu and Fernald (1997), Basu and
Kimball (1997), Shea (1999), Gordon (2004), Wen (2004), Arias, Hansen, and Ohanian (2007), and
Gordon (2010)
5To simplify the argument, we assume hours per worker are constant, consistent with the observation
that in the US data most adjustments in total hours worked take place along the extensive margin.
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costs are convex, frictions are higher when the average level of hiring is higher. E¤ort
et provides an alternative margin of adjustment of labour input and is not subject to
those frictions (or to a lesser degree). Thus, the larger the frictions, the less employment
uctuates and the more volatile uctuations in e¤ort. As a result, a decline in turnover
reduces the average amount of hiring, reduces frictions, decreases the volatility of e¤ort
and therefore increases the relative volatility of employment with respect to output.
The increased volatility of nt also makes labour productivity less procyclical, and, in
the presence of shocks other than shifts in technology, may even make productivity
countercyclical, consistent with the evidence reported below.
Our argument that the vanishing procyclicality of labour productivity may have
been driven by a reduction in hiring frictions is consistent with the observation that the
relative volatility of (a proxy for) e¤ort decreased. Leading alternative explanations rely
on changes in the relative importance of di¤erent drivers of business cycle uctuations.
Barnichon (2010) argues non-technology shocks became more important compared to
technology shocks, and Garin, Pries, and Sims (2018) show a large decline in the im-
portance of aggregate versus reallocative shocks around the mid 1980s and argue this
can explain the vanishing procyclicality of labour productivity. The problem with these
explanations is that they do not explain why similar changes in dynamics are observed
also when conditioning on particular shocks, as in Galí and Gambetti (2009).
The vanishing procyclicality of labour productivity did not happen in isolation.
Other changes in US labour market dynamics that happened around the same time and
that may or may not be related include the great moderation in output volatility (Stock
and Watson (2002)), the emergence of the slow recoveries (Galí, Smets, and Wouters
(2012)), and perhaps a change in the lead-lag structure of employment and output or
jobless recoveries (van Rens (2004), Bachmann (2012), Brault and Khan (2020)). We do
not claim to have a explanation for all labour market phenomena, and a comprehensive
analysis of all of these changes is outside the scope of this paper. However, we briey
discuss why we believe that slow recoveries are unrelated to the vanishing procyclicality
of productivity in our concluding section 5.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 documents the changes
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in the patterns of uctuations in labour productivity and employment. Section 3 de-
velops the basic model. Section 4 describes the outcome of simulations of a calibrated
version of the model, and discusses its consistency with the evidence. Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 Changes in Labour Market Dynamics
We document two stylised facts regarding postwar changes in US economic uctuations.
The changes that motivate our investigation pertain to the cyclical behaviour of labour
productivity and labour input. The facts we report are not new. However, and to the
best of our knowledge, this paper is the rst to provide a joint explanation for both of
these changes.
We use quarterly time series for output and labour input over the period 1948:1-
2015:4 from the BLS Labour Productivity and Cost (LPC) program, and calculate labour
productivity as the ratio between output and labour input.6 To illustrate the changes in
the di¤erent statistics considered, we split the sample period into two subperiods, pre-84
(1948:1-1984:4) and post-85 (1985:1-2015:4). The break date is chosen to be halfway
the decade, in which the decline in labour market turnover started, and roughly halfway
between the 1981-82 and 1990-91 recessions.7 This choice is fairly arbitrary, and we do
not make any claims about the specic timing of the various changes in labour market
dynamics.
We apply three alternative transformations on the logarithms of all variables in
order to render the original time series stationary. Our preferred transformation uses
the bandpass (BP) lter to remove uctuations with periodicities below 6 and above
32 quarters, as in Stock and Watson (1999). We also apply the fourth-di¤erence (4D)
operator, which is the transformation favored by Stock and Watson (2002) in their
analysis of changes in output volatility, as well as the more common HP lter with
6The series IDs are PRS85006093 (output per hour) and PRS85006163 (output per worker) for
productivity, PRS85006043 for output, PRS85006033 for hours, and PRS85006013 for employment.
7The decline in the separation rate seems to start immediately after the 1981-82 recession, see e.g.
Figure 1 in Cairó and Cajner (2018). However, we are reluctant to split the sample right at the end of
a recession.
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smoothing parameter 1600.
2.1 The Vanishing Procyclicality of Labour Productivity
Figure 1 shows the uctuations at business cycle frequencies in labour productivity in
the US over the postwar period. It is clear from the graph that in the earlier part of the
sample, productivity was signicantly below trend in each recession. However, in the
later years this is no longer the case. When we calculate the correlation of productivity
with output or employment, as in Figure 2, it is clear that there is a sharp drop in the
cyclicality of productivity. The correlation of productivity with output, which used to
be strongly positive, fell to a level close to zero, while the correlation of productivity
with employment, which was zero or slightly positive in the earlier period of the sample,
became negative.
These ndings are formalised in Table 1, which reports the contemporaneous corre-
lation between labour productivity and output and employment, for alternative trans-
formations and time periods. In each case, we report the estimated correlation for the
pre-84 and post-85 subsamples, as well as the di¤erence between those estimates. The
standard errors, reported in brackets, are computed using the delta method.8 We now
turn to a short discussion of the results in this Table.
2.1.1 Correlation with Output
Independently of the detrending procedure, the correlation of output per hour with
output in the pre-84 period is high and signicantly positive, with a point estimate
around 0:63. In other words, in the early part of the sample labour productivity was
clearly procyclical.
In the post-85 period, however, that pattern changed considerably. The estimates
of the productivity-output correlation dropped to a value close to (and not signicantly
di¤erent from) zero. The di¤erence with the corresponding pre-84 estimates is highly
8We use least squares (GMM) to estimate the second moments (variances and and covariances) of
each pair of variables, as well as the (asymptotic) variance-covariance matrix of this estimator. Then,
we calculate the standard errors for the standard deviations, the relative standard deviations and the
correlation coe¢ cient using the delta method.
6
signicant. Thus, on the basis of those estimates labour productivity has become an
acyclical variable (with respect to output) over the past two decades.
When we use an employment-based measure of labour productivity, output per
worker, the estimated correlations also drop substantially but remain signicantly greater
than zero in the post-85 period. This should not be surprising given that hours per
worker are highly procyclical in both subperiods and that their volatility relative to
employment-based labour productivity has increased considerably.9
2.1.2 Correlation with Labour Input
The right-hand side panels in Table 1 display several estimates of the correlation between
labour productivity and labour input. The estimates for the pre-84 period are low, but
still signicantly greater than zero. Thus, labour productivity was procyclical with
respect to labour input in that subperiod, although much less so than with respect to
output. This low correlation is consistent with the evidence reported in the early RBC
literature, using data up to the mid 80s.10
As was the case when using output as the cyclical indicator, the estimated correla-
tions between labour productivity and employment decline dramatically in the post-85
period. In fact these correlations become signicantly negative, with a point estimate
ranging from  0:42 to  0:56 for output per hour and from  0:13 to  0:30 for output
per worker, depending on the lter. By this measure, labour productivity in the past
two decades appears to have become strongly countercyclical. The changes with respect
to the pre-84 period are again highly signicant.
9Letting n and h denote employment and total hours respectively, a straightforward algebraic ma-
nipulation yields the identity:
(y   n; y) = y h
y n
(y   h; y) + h n
y n
(h  n; y)
Thus, even in the case of acyclical hours-based labour productivity, i.e. (y h; y) ' 0, we would expect
(y   n; y) to remain positive if hours per worker are procyclical, i.e. (h  n; y) > 0.
10Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) used data up to 1983:4 (which coincides with the cut-o¤ date
for our rst subperiod), but starting in 1955:4. Their estimates of the correlation between labour
productivity and hours were  0:20 when using household data and 0:16 using establishment data.
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2.1.3 Discussion
The nding that labour productivity may have become countercyclical is controversial.
We showed that the change in sign only occurs if we use the correlation of produc-
tivity with output rather than labour input as the measure of cyclicality. Moreover,
the correlation of productivity with labour input also stays positive if we use the Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS) rather than the Current Employment Statistics (CES)
to measure employment (Hagedorn and Manovskii (2011), Ramey (2012)), and labour
productivity is overall more procyclical if we use the American Time Use Survey (ATUS)
data to measure hours worked (Burda, Hamermesh, and Stewart (2013)). We do not
take a strong stance on whether or not the correlation of productivity with the cycle
changed sign. Our nding that the cyclicality of productivity declined strongly over
time is highly signicant, robust, and consistent with other studies.
2.2 The Rising Relative Volatility of Labour Input
The left-hand panel of Table 2 displays the standard deviation of several measures of
labour input in the pre-84 and post-85 periods, as well as the ratio between the two. The
variables considered include employment and hours in the private sector. The decline
in the volatility of hours, like that of other major macro variables, is seen to be large
and highly signicant, with the standard deviation falling between 13% and 24% and
always signicantly so.
A more interesting piece of evidence is the change in the relative volatility of labour
input, measured as the ratio of the standard deviation of labour input to the standard
deviation of output. These estimates are presented in the right-hand panel of Table 2.
Labour input experienced an increase in its relative volatility in the post versus pre-
84 period. In other words, the decline in the variability of labour input has been less
pronounced than that of output. The increase in the relative volatility of hours worked
ranges from 38% to 52%. The corresponding increase for employment is slightly smaller,
ranging from 33% to 51%, and in both cases the decline is statistically signicant.
The previous evidence points to a rise in the elasticity of labour input with respect
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to output. Put di¤erently, rms appear to have relied increasingly on labour input
adjustments in order to meet their changes in output.
2.3 Conclusion and Further Evidence
Summarizing, we showed that the cyclicality of labour productivity in the US declined
strongly some time in the 80s. Labour productivity became less procyclical or acyclical
with respect to output, and perhaps even countercyclical with respect to employment. In
addition, the relative volatility of employment and hours increased. For completeness,
we also report that the relative volatility of labour productivity increased, and the
correlation between employment and output decreased slightly, see appendix A.11
The decline in the procyclicality of productivity is observed within industries as well
(Wang (2014), Fernald and Wang (2016)), and is therefore not driven by changes in the
industry composition. The industry-level evidence also support our observation that
the decline in the procyclicality of labour productivity may be related to the rise in the
relative volatility of labour input. Using data on industry productivity from the BLS
labour productivity and cost program (US KLEMS data), we show in appendix B.1 that
industries that experienced a larger decline in the correlation between productivity and
output also saw a larger increase in the relatively volatility of employment and hours.
The changes in business cycle dynamics that we documented roughly coincided with
the decline in labour market turnover. This strong decline in labour market turnover
appears to be specic to the US, and there is no evidence for a similar reversal of the
cyclicality of labour productivity in other countries, see appendix B.2. Lewis, Villa,
and Wolters (2018) document di¤erences in the procyclicality of productivity between
Europe and the US, and argue these can be explained with a model with variable e¤ort
similar to ours.
In the remainder of this paper, we explore whether the observed changes in business
cycle dynamics may be explained by a structural change in the labour market. We
show that the vanishing procyclicality of labour productivity and the increasing relative
11These observations are completely determined by the statistics already reported and do not contain
independent information. We emphasised the statistics that we consider easiest to interpret.
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volatility of employment can indeed be explained by a reduction in hiring costs resulting
from the decline in labour market turnover.
3 A Model of Fluctuations with Labour Market Frictions
and Endogenous E¤ort
Having documented in some detail the changing patterns of labour productivity and
labour input, we turn to possible explanations. More specically, and as anticipated in
the introduction, we explore the hypothesis that the changes documented above may
have, at least partly, been caused by a reduction in labour market frictions.
To formalise this explanation, we develop a model of uctuations with labour market
frictions, modelled as adjustment costs in employment (hiring costs). The crucial element
in this model is an endogenous e¤ort choice, which provides an intensive margin for
labour adjustment that is not subject to the adjustment costs. Since the purpose of the
model is to illustrate the main mechanisms at work, we keep the model as simple as
possible in dimensions that are likely to be orthogonal to the factors emphasised by our
analysis. Thus, we abstract from endogenous capital accumulation, trade in goods and
assets with the rest of the world, and imperfections in the goods and nancial markets.
We also ignore any kind of monetary frictions, even though we recognise that these, in
conjunction with changes in the conduct of monetary policy in the Volcker-Greenspan
years, may have played an important role in changes in business cycle dynamics.12
3.1 Households
Households are innitely-lived and consist of a continuum of identical members repre-
sented by the unit interval. The household is the relevant decision unit for choices about
consumption and labour supply. Each household members utility function is additively
separable in consumption and leisure, and the household assigns equal consumption Ct
to all members in order to share consumption risk within the household. Thus, the
12See, e.g. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) for a discussion of the possible role of monetary policy
in the Great Moderation.
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households objective function is given by,13
E0
1X
t=0
t
"
ZtC
1 
t
1     Lt
#
(1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor,  2 [0; 1] is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution,  > 0 can be interpreted as a xed cost of working and Zt
is a preference shock. The second term in the period utility function is disutility from
e¤ective labour supply Lt, which depends on the fraction Nt of household members that
are employed, as well as on the amount of e¤ort Eit exerted by each employed household
member i. Formally,
Lt =
Z Nt
0
1 + E1+it
1 + 
di =
1 + E1+t
1 + 
Nt (2)
where the second equality imposes the equilibrium condition that all working household
members exert the same level of e¤ort, Eit = Et for all i. The parameter   0 measures
the importance of e¤ort for the disutility of working, and the elasticity parameter   0
determines the degree of increasing marginal disutility from exerting e¤ort. For sim-
plicity we assume a constant workweek, thus restricting the intensive margin of labour
input adjustment to changes in e¤ort.
The household maximises its objective function above subject to the sequence of
budget constraints,
Ct =
Z Nt
0
Witdi+ t (3)
where t represents rms prots, which are paid out to households in the form of
lump-sum dividends, and Wit are wages accruing to employed household member i.
The household takes into account the e¤ect of its decisions on the level of e¤ort exerted
by its members.
13We assume utility is linear in e¤ective labour for simplicity. The implication that the Frisch elasticity
of labour supply is innity is of course counterfactual, but our results are very similar if we assume a
Frisch elasticity of 0:25, as advocated by Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2012).
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3.2 Firms
Firms produce a homogenous consumption good using a production technology that
uses labour and e¤ort as inputs,
Yt = At
Z Nt
0
E itdi
1 
= At

E t Nt
1 
(4)
where Yt is output, Eit is e¤ort exerted by worker i,  2 (0; 1) is a parameter that
measures diminishing returns to total labour input in production,  2 [0; 1] measures
additional diminishing returns to e¤ort, and At is a technology shock common to all
rms. Since all rms are identical, we normalise the number of rms to the unit interval,
so that Yt and Nt denote output and employment of each rm as well as aggregate output
and employment in the economy. The second equality imposes the equilibrium condition
that all workers in a rm exert the same level of e¤ort, Eit = Et for all i.
Firms choose how many workers to hire Ht in order to maximise the expected dis-
counted value of prots,
E0
1X
t=0
Q0;t [Yt  WtNt   g (Ht)] (5)
where the function g (:), with g0 > 0 and g00 > 0, represents the costs (in terms of output)
of hiring new workers, subject to a law of motion for employment implied by the labour
market frictions,
Nt = (1  )Nt 1 +Ht (6)
where  is the gross separation rate (employment exit probability). In section 4 below,
we will model the reduction in labour market turnover as a reduction in the parameter ,
which will reduce labour market frictions because of the convexity of the cost function
g (:). As a limiting case, we will also consider a frictionless labour market, setting
g (H) = 0 for all H.
The stochastic discount factor is dened recursively asQ0;t  Q0;1Q1;2:::Qt 1;t, where
Qt;t+1  Zt+1
Zt

Ct
Ct+1

(7)
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measures the marginal rate of substitution between two subsequent periods. Like the
household, the rm takes into account the e¤ect of its decisions on the level of e¤ort
exerted by its workers.
3.3 E¤ort Choice and Job Creation
The household and the rm jointly decide the wage and the level of e¤ort that the worker
will put into the job. In equilibrium, the e¤ort level of all workers is set e¢ ciently,
maximizing the total surplus generated by each match.14 This e¢ cient e¤ort level, in
each period and for each worker, equates the cost of exerting more e¤ort, higher disutility
to the household, to the benet, higher production and therefore prots for the rm.
Consider a worker i, who is a member of household h and is employed in rm j. The
marginal disutility to the household from that worker exerting more e¤ort, expressed
in terms of consumption, is obtained from equation (2) for total e¤ective labour supply
and equals:
Cht
Zt
@Lht
@Eit =
(1 + ) 
1 + 
ChtEit
Zt
di (8)
The marginal product of that additional e¤ort to the rm is found from production
function (4):
@Yjt
@Eit = (1  ) At
Z Njt
0
E vtdv
 
E (1  )it di (9)
In equilibrium, the marginal disutility from e¤ort must equal its marginal product for
all workers i. Also, because all rms and all households are identical, it must be that
Cht = Ct and Njt = Nt in equilibrium. Therefore, it follows that all workers exert the
same level of e¤ort in equilibrium, Eit = Et for all i. Imposing this property, we obtain
the following equilibrium condition for e¤ort,
Et =

(1  ) (1 + )
(1 + ) 
Zt
Ct
AtN
 
t
 1
1+ (1 ) 
(10)
14Suppose not. Then, household and rm could agree on a di¤erent e¤ort level that increases total
match surplus, and a modied surplus sharing rule (wage) that would make both parties better o¤.
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or, using production function (4) to simplify:
E1+t =
 
1 + 
1 + 

Zt
Ct
(1  )Yt
Nt
(11)
When considering whether to hire a worker, rms take into account the impact of
the resulting increase in employment on the e¤ort level exerted by their workers. Thus,
the marginal product of a new hire is given by,15
dYjt
dNjt
=
@Yjt
@Njt
+
@Yjt
@Ejt
@Ejt
@Njt
= (1 	F ) (1  )Yt
Nt
(12)
where 	F =
 
1+ (1 ) measures the additional (negative) e¤ect from a new hire on
output that comes from the endogenous response of the e¤ort level in the rm.
Maximizing the expected net present value of prots (5), where output is given by
production function (4) and the stochastic discount factor by (7), subject to the law
of motion for employment implied by the matching technology (6) and the equilibrium
condition for e¤ort (11), gives rise to the following rst order condition,
g0 (Ht) = SFt (13)
where SFt is the marginal value to the rm of having an additional worker in period t,
which is given by,
SFt = (1 	F )
(1  )Yt
Nt
 Wt + (1  )Et

Qt;t+1S
F
t+1

(14)
= Et
1X
s=0
(1  )sQt;t+s

(1 	F ) (1  )Yt+s
Nt+s
 Wt+s

(15)
where the second equality follows from iterating forward (and dening Qt;t = 1). This
15With a slight abuse of notation, Ejt denotes the e¤ort level exerted by all workers (from di¤erent
households) in a particular rm j. Firm j considers employing Njt workers, given that all other rms
employ the equilibrium number of workers Nt. Because there are innitely many rms, rm js decision
to employ Njt 66= Nt workers does not a¤ect the fraction of household hs members that are employed, so
that by the assumption of perfect risk-sharing within the household, the consumption of workers in rm
j, Cht = Ct, is not a¤ected. Therefore, the relation between e¤ort and employment that the rm faces
if all other rms (and all households) play equilibrium strategies, is given by equation (10), keeping Ct
xed. See appendix C for details on the derivation of equation (12).
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is a job creation equation, which states that the marginal costs of hiring a new worker
g0 (Ht), must equal the expected net present value of marginal prots (additional output
minus the wage) of the lled job, SFt .
3.4 Wage Bargaining
Employment relationships generate a strictly positive surplus. This property of our
model comes from the assumption that wages and e¤ort levels are determined after
employment adjustment costs are sunk: if rm and worker cannot agree to continue their
relationship, then the rm has to pay the hiring costs again in order to nd another
worker to match with. We make this timing assumption in order to generate wage
setting under bilateral monopoly, as in a search and matching model, which we believe
to be a realistic feature of the labour market.16 Firms and households bargain over the
wage as a way to share the match surplus. These negotations are limited only by the
outside option of each party. The lower bound of the bargaining set is given by the
reservation wage of the household, the wage o¤er at which the household is indi¤erent
between accepting the o¤er and looking for another job. Similarly, the upper bound of
the bargaining set is the reservation wage of the rm, the wage o¤er that makes the rm
indi¤erent between accepting the o¤er and hiring a di¤erent worker. The bounds of the
bargaining set are endogenous variables, for which we now derive equilibrium conditions.
Then, the bargained wage can be written simply as a linear combination of the upper
and lower bounds of the bargaining set.
The part of the match surplus that accrues to the rm SFt , as a function of the wage,
is given by equation (14). In order to derive a similar expression for the households part
of the surplus SHt , we must rst calculate the marginal disutility to the household of
having one additional employed member, taking into account the endogenous response
16Specically, the within-period timing we assume is the following. First, aggregate shocks realise
and a randomly chosen fraction  of employed workers is separated from their jobs. Second, rms that
want to hire pay employment adjustment costs g (Ht) and are randomly matched with Ht non-employed
workers. Third, rm and worker bilaterally and with full commitment decide on the e¤ort the worker will
put into the job and the wage she will be paid for doing it. If a rm and a worker cannot agree, the worker
is placed back into the unemployment pool and the rm pays g0 (Ht) in order to get another random
draw from that pool. Since all unemployed workers are identical, this never happens in equilibrium.
When a rm and worker do reach an agreement, the worker is hired and added to the pool of employed
workers. Finally, production, consumption and utility are realised.
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of e¤ort. This marginal disutility of employment, expressed in terms of consumption, is
given by,17
Ct
Zt
dLht
dNht
=
1
1 + 
Ct
Zt

1 + 
(1 + ) 	H
 
E1+t

=
1
1 + 
Ct
Zt
+ 	H
(1  )Yt
Nt
(16)
where the second equality follows from substituting equation (11), and where 	H =
 
1+
(1 )(1+)  
1+  captures the e¤ect on utility of one more employed member in the
household through the endogenous response of e¤ort. Using this expression, we can
take a derivative of the households objective function (1) with respect to Nt and divide
by the marginal utility of consumption, to obtain the following expression for SHt .
SHt = Wt  
1
1 + 
Ct
Zt
 	H (1  )Yt
Nt
+ (1  )Et

Qt;t+1S
H
t+1

(17)
The value to the household of having one more employed worker, equals the wage minus
the disutility expressed in terms of consumption, plus the expected value of still having
that worker next period, which is discounted by the probability that the worker is still
employed next period.
The upper bound of the bargaining set WUBt is the highest wage such that S
F
t  0,
whereas the lower bound WLBt is the lowest wage such that S
H
t  0. Using equations
(14) and (17), we get SFt = W
UB
t  Wt and SHt = Wt  WLBt . Substituting back into
equations (13), (14) and (17), we can explicitly write the equilibrium of the model in
terms of the wage and the bounds of the bargaining set.
g0 (Ht) = WUBt  Wt (18)
WUBt = (1 	F )
(1  )Yt
Nt
+ (1  )Et

Qt;t+1
 
WUBt+1  Wt+1

(19)
WLBt =
1
1 + 
Ct
Zt
+ 	H
(1  )Yt
Nt
+ (1  )Et

Qt;t+1
 
WLBt+1  Wt+1

(20)
Nash bargaining assumes that the wage is set such that the total surplus from the match
17The derivation of this expression is similar to that of equation (12), see appendix C for details.
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is split in equal proportions between household and rm.18 It is straightforward to see
that in our framework, SHt =
1
2
 
SHt + S
F
t

= 12
 
WUBt  WLBt

, so that
Wt =
1
2
 
WUBt +W
LB
t

(21)
the wage is the average of the lower and upper bounds of the bargaining set.
3.5 Equilibrium
We conclude the description of the model by listing the conditions that characterise the
equilibrium. The equilibrium level of e¤ort is determined by e¢ ciency condition (11).
Vacancy posting decisions by rms are summarised by the job creation equation (18).
Wage negotations are described by equation (21), and stochastic di¤erence equations
for the upper and lower bounds of the bargaining set (19) and (20). Employment
evolves according to its law of motion (6). Finally, goods market clearing requires that
consumption equals output minus hiring costs.
Ct = Yt   g (Ht) (22)
Output is dened as in production function (4), the stochastic discount factor as the
marginal rate of intertemporal substitution (7), and the parameters 	F =
 
1+ (1 ) 
and 	H =
 
1+
(1 )(1+)  
1+  are functions of the structural parameters. In total, we
have 7 equations in the endogenous variables Ht, Et, Wt, WUBt , WLBt , Nt and Ct, or 9
equations including the denitions for Yt and Qt;t+1.
Without an endogenous e¤ort choice ( = 0 so that e¤ort is not useful in production,
	F = 	H = 0, and Et = 0 for all t in equilibrium), the model reduces to a standard
RBC model with labour market frictions. However, unlike in the standard model, uc-
tuations in our model are driven by technology shocks as well as non-technology shocks
or preference shocks. The two driving forces of uctuations, log total factor productivity
at  logAt and log preferences over consumption zt  logZt follow stationary AR(1)
18The symmetry assumption is not crucial, but simplies the solution of the model substantially. We
show in appendix G that our results are virtually unchanged for bargaining power well below and above
0:5.
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processes,
at = aat 1 + "
a
t (23)
zt = zzt 1 + "
z
t (24)
where "at and "
z
t are independent white noise processes with variances given by 
2
a and
2z respectively.
4 Implications of the Reduction in Labour Market Fric-
tions
We now proceed to use our model to analyze the possible role of a reduction in labour
market frictions in generating the observed changes in the cyclical patterns of labour
productivity and labour input. First, we briey discuss the possible causes of the re-
duction in frictions and the coinciding decline in labour market turnover and argue that
these are plausibly exogenous to our model. We then start our analysis of the impli-
cations of this change with a version of our model with a frictionless labour market.
The frictionless model provides a useful benchmark that we can solve for in closed form.
Then, we rely on numerical methods to simulate the model with frictions for di¤erent
values of the parameters.
4.1 Innovations in Job Search and the Decline in Turnover
One of the most striking changes on the labour market over the past few decades are
innovations in job search technology.19 Mercan (2017) argues these improved technolo-
gies have led to a better functioning labour market characterised by better information
and lower turnover. Increased information among employers and workers about each
other and about their prospective matches means that low quality matches are less
frequent. Matches that are being formed are thus of higher quality, and there is less
incentive for rm and worker to separate. The result is a reduction in separations, both
19Examples are internet-based vacancy posting, online platforms with insider reviews on work envi-
ronment, background checks, employee referrals, and professional hiring services, see Mercan (2017),
footnote 7 on page 2.
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due to employer-to-employer (EE) transitions and separations leading to unemployment
(EU ows). Mercan (2017) shows that a formal model of improved information can
quantitatively match the large observed reduction in EE ows.20
In our model, a reduction in labour market turnover may be represented by a re-
duction in the exogenous separation rate . It is possible, as we show in appendix D,
to incorporate Mercan (2017)s information channel into our model and thus endogenise
the reduction in turnover. However, in order to not distract from the contribution of this
paper, we instead model an exogenous decline in , calibrated directly to the observed
decline in the data. In fact, it is not important for the purposes of this paper that the
entire decline in turnover is caused by an improvement in information, as long as it is
exogenous to our model. Other reasons why turnover may have declined that have been
proposed in the literature are decreased business volatility (Davis, Faberman, Halti-
wanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2010)), decreased job security (Fujita (2018)), increased
specicity of human capital (Cairó (2013)) and the aging of the workforce (Karahan and
Rhee (2014)). These are all exogenous changes in the context of our model.
In response to the decline in turnover, labour market frictions decrease in our model.
This e¤ect arises because of our assumption that adjustment costs in employment are
convex, and we discuss this crucial assumption in section 4.4 below. We show below that
the observed decline in turnover is su¢ cient to quantitatively generate the reduction in
frictions needed to explain the changes in labour market dynamics.
4.2 Frictionless Labour Market
Consider the limiting case of an economy without labour market frictions, i.e. g (H) = 0
for all H. The rst thing to note is that in this case the width of the bargaining set
collapses to zero, and the job creation equation (18) and the wage block of the model,
equations (21), (19) and (20), imply
Wt = W
UB
t = W
LB
t = (1 	F )
(1  )Yt
Nt
=
1
1 + 
Ct
Zt
+ 	H
(1  )Yt
Nt
(25)
20The model also predicts a reduction in EU ows, but can only account for a fraction of the observed
decline. However, this may be due to the absence of job-to-job moving costs from the model, see
appendix D.
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for all t. Employment becomes a choice variable, so that its law of motion (6) is dropped
from the system and employment is instead determined by the static condition (25).
Nt = (1  ) (1 	F  	H) (1 + )ZtYt
Ct
(26)
Substituting into the equilibrium condition for e¤ort (11), we obtain
E1+t =
 
1 + 
1

1
1 	F  	H (27)
implying an e¤ort level that is invariant to uctuations in the models driving forces.
Since e¤ort has stronger diminishing returns in production and stronger increasing mar-
ginal disutility than employment, this intensive margin of adjustment is never used if
the extensive margin is not subject to frictions.
Without hiring costs, the aggregate resource constraint (22) reduces to Ct = Yt.
Combining the resource constraint and equations (26) and (27) with the production
function (4), we can derive closed-form expressions for equilibrium employment, output,
wages and labour productivity. Using lower-case letters to denote the natural logarithms
of the original variables, ignoring constant terms and normalizing the variance of the
shocks,21 we get:
nt = (1  ) at + zt (28)
yt = at + (1  ) zt (29)
wt = yt   nt = at   zt (30)
A useful benchmark is the model with logarithmic utility over consumption ( = 1). In
this case, employment uctuates in proportion to the preference shifter zt but does not
respond to technology shocks.22
From the previous equations, it is straightforward to calculate the models implica-
21 If the original shocks are ~at and ~zt, then we dene at = 
~at and zt = 
~zt, where 
 =
1= [1  (1  ) (1  )].
22This result is an implication of the logarithmic or balanced growthpreferences over consumption
in combination with the absence of capital or any other intertemporal smoothing technology, and is
similar to the neutrality resultin Shimer (2010).
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tions for the second moments of interest. In particular we have
cov (yt   nt; yt) =  var (at)   (1  ) var (zt) (31)
cov (yt   nt; nt) =  (1  ) var (at)   var (zt) (32)
In the absence of labour market frictions, labour productivity is unambiguously coun-
tercyclical in response to preference shocks. The intuition for this result is that output
responds to preference shocks only through employment, and this response is less than
proportional because of diminishing returns in labour input ( > 0). Since productivity
is unambiguously procyclical in response to technology shocks, the unconditional corre-
lations depend on the relative variances of the shocks and the model parameters. For a
wide range of parameter values, e.g. with logarithmic utility over consumption ( = 1),
productivity is procyclical with respect to output but countercyclical with respect to
employment.
The relative volatility of employment with respect to output is given by the following
expression:
var (nt)
var (yt)
=
(1  )2 var (at) + var (zt)
var (at) + (1  )2 var (zt)
(33)
The relative volatility depends again on the relative importance of the shocks, as well as
on the size of , the parameter determining the degree of diminishing returns to labour.
4.3 Preview of the Results
We can contrast the predictions of the frictionless model above, with the opposite ex-
treme case of innitely large labour market frictions, i.e. g (H) = 1 if H > 0. In this
case, no new workers will be hired, so that by the aggregate resource constraint (22)
Ct = Yt, as in the frictionless case. For simplicity, also assume that the separation rate
equals zero,  = 0, so that employment is xed. In this case, combining the produc-
tion function (4) with the equilibrium condition for e¤ort (11), and taking logarithms,
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ignoring constant terms and normalizing the variance of the shocks,23 we get:
et = (1  ) at + zt (34)
yt = yt   nt = (1 + ) at + (1  ) zt (35)
Since employment is xed, e¤ort is now procyclical in response to both types of shocks,
as all of the adjustment of labour input occurs on the intensive margin. With innitely
large frictions, labour productivity is perfectly (positively) correlated with output. The
correlation between productivity and employment, as well as the relative volatility of
employment with respect to output equal zero.
Comparing the predictions of the model with very high turnover and therefore very
large labour market frictions, to the model with a very low separation rate and therefore
with hiring frictions close to zero, it is clear that for a su¢ cienly large decline in labour
market turnover:
1. Labour productivity becomes less procyclical with respect to output.
2. Labour productivity goes from acyclical to countercyclical with respect to employ-
ment, depending on parameter values (a su¢ cient condition is logarithmic utility
over consumption).
3. The relative volatility of employment increases.
These predictions are consistent with the data, as we documented in section 2. Three
elements of our model are crucial for this result: convex employment adjustment costs,
multiple shocks, and endogenous e¤ort.
We are not arguing, of course, that labour market turnover fell so much that labour
market frictions went from innity to zero. Rather, the argument so far is meant to illus-
trate that if the decline in labour market turnover was large enough, it can qualitatively
explain the patterns we observe in the data. We will show that the same result holds
in the full model, although the intuition is more subtle, see appendix E. To answer
23 In this case, the normalization factor is 1= [1 +   (1  ) (1  ) ].
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the question whether we can also quantitatively match those patterns for reasonable
parameter values, we now turn to a numerical analysis.
4.4 Calibration
We simulate data at quarterly frequency and calibrate accordingly. The calibration is
summarised in Table 3. Many of the models parameters can be easily calibrated to
values that are standard in the literature. In this vein, we set the discount factor 
equal to 0:99, assume logarithmic utility over consumption ( = 1), and assume  = 1=3
for the curvature of the production function to match the capital share in GDP. In the
model there is no di¤erence between unemployment and non-participation. Therefore,
we set the marginal utility from leisure  to match the employment-population ratio.
Since the amount of labour market frictions a¤ects this ratio as well, we calibrate to an
employment-population ratio of 0:7 in the frictionless model.
The calibration of the labour market frictions is crucial for the simulation exercise.
Estimates of the convexity of employment adjustment costs vary, with the exponent 1+
of the cost function g (H) = 1+H
1+ ranging from 1.6 to 3.4. The lower end of this
range corresponds to a specication, in which we interpret the adjustment costs as search
frictions, vacancy posting costs are linear and the matching function has an elasticity
with respect to unemployment of 0.6, as in Mortensen and Nagypal (2007). The upper
end of the range is the point estimate of the convexity of employment adjustment costs
in Merz and Yashiv (2007). In our benchmark specication, we use the midpoint of this
range and assume an exponent of 1 +  = 2:5, but we explore the implications for our
results if adjustment costs are less or more convex than that.24 We calibrate  such that
24Here, we mean convex in the sense that we assume that hiring an additional worker is most costly if
starting from a higher rather than a lower baseline level of hiring, i.e. g (H1 + ") g (H1) < g (H0 + ") 
g (H0), for a small " > 0 and realistic levels of hiring H0 and H1 < H0. Perhaps the easiest way to justify
this assumption is as a representation of diminishing returns in the matching function (Blanchard and
Galí (2010)), a standard assumption in the labour market literature. This concept of convexity is only
tangientially related to the literature on whether adjustment costs are convexor non-convex. In that
literature, many authors have advocated a discontinuity or a kink in the adjustment cost function around
zero, resulting in irreversibilty and lumpy adjustment at least at the plant level (Caballero and Engel
(2004), Varejao and Portugal (2007)), while others have argued that a smooth (convex) adjustment costs
function provides a good approximation for the aggregate dynamics for capital (Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006), Khan and Thomas (2008)) and employment (Cooper and Willis (2004), Ejarque and Nilsen
(2008), Blatter, Muehlemann, and Schenker (2012)). Since the aggregate level of hiring, including
replacement hiring, is well above zero in all periods, a non-convexity at zero is not important for our
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hiring costs are 3% of output in calibration for the pre-84 period, consistent with the
estimates in Silva and Toledo (2009), see also Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008, p.1699).
The employment outow rate declined by about 50%, from 4% per month in the
early 1980s to 2% per month in the mid-1990s (Davis, Faberman, Haltiwanger, Jarmin,
and Miranda (2010), Fujita (2018), Cairó and Cajner (2018)).25 Using these estimates,
we calibrate the gross separation rate  in our model to 35% per quarter for the pre-84
subsample and to 20% per quarter for the post-85 period.26 In equilibrium, the decline in
the separation rate implies a decline in job creation, because the amount of replacement
hiring that is necessary to maintain a certain level of employment decreases. This e¤ect
is dampened, however, by the lower cost of hiring, which raises equilibrium employment
by about 14%.
For the models driving forces, we assume high persistence in both shocks, setting
a = 0:97 to match the rst-order autocorrelation in Solow residuals, and z = 0:97
to make sure that none of the results are driven by di¤erences in persistence. Given
those values, we calibrate 2a and 
2
z so that the frictionless version of the calibrated
model matches the relative volatility of employment and predicts a standard deviation
of log output of 1%. The rst target is justied by the observation that in this very
simple model, preference shocks are a stand-in for all sources of misspecication that
result in the unemployment volatility puzzle. The second target is arbitrarily chosen
to emphasise that we consider this model mostly illustrative and not able to generate
results.
25The estimates in Fujita (2018) di¤er from those in Davis, Faberman, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and
Miranda (2010) and Cairó and Cajner (2018) because Fujita calculates worker ows from matching the
labour force status of workers in the monthly CPS les, whereas the other two studies use data on
unemployment duration following Shimer (2012). The size of the proportional decline in the separation
rate is very similar in both approaches, but the level of the separation rate is di¤erent. Starting with
Shimer (2005), it is common in the literature to calibrate models to the level of the separation rate as
calculated from the unemployment duration data, resulting in a post-war sample average of about 3%
per month.
26The quarterly separation probability is the probability that a worker who is employed at the begin-
ning of the quarter is no longer employed at the end of the quarter. Using a monthly job nding probabil-
ity of fm = 0:45, see Shimer (2012), and a monthly separation probability of sm = 0:04, we get a quarterly
separation probability of s = sm (1  fm)2 + (1  sm) sm (1  fm) + (1  sm)2 sm + s2mfm = 0:07 and a
quarterly job nding probability of f = fm (1  sm)2 + (1  fm) fm (1  sm) + (1  fm)2 fm + f2msm =
0:80. The gross separation rate is the average number of times that a worker who is employed at
the beginning of the quarter loses her job over the quarter. Since workers that are separated in a
given quarter may nd another job within that quarter, the quarterly gross separation rate is given by
 = s= (1  f) = 0:35. For more detail and robustness analysis, see appendix F.
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realistic predictions for the overall level of volatility in the economy.
For the parameters related to e¤ort, we have very little guidance from previous
literature. We normalise  = 0 and  such that e¤ort is expressed in utility units
and equals 1 in the frictionless steady state. We treat the curvature of the production
function in e¤ort  as a free parameter. Since we are mostly interested to illustrate
the qualitative changes in the business cycle moments that the model can generate, we
set this parameter fairly abitrarily to  = 0:3, so that the model roughly replicates the
second moments in the data. The testable prediction here is not whether the model
can quantitatively match some or most of the second moments, but whether it can
qualitatively generate all observed changes, changing only the level of labour market
frictions.
4.5 Quantitative Results
We now simulate the calibrated model in order to calculate the second moments of
interest. The aim is to show that a decline in labour market turnover of the same size as
observed in the US, roughly matches the change in the cyclicality of labour productivity
and the relative volatility of labour input in the data. We simulate the second-order
approximation of the model 201; 000 periods, discarding the rst 1; 000 observations to
eliminate the e¤ect of the initial conditions. The results of this exercise are reported in
Table 4.
Labour productivity is strongly procyclical in terms of its correlation with output in
the model and its procyclicality falls substantially as we reduce labour market turnover.
The correlation of productivity with employment also falls, from around zero in the
labour market with high turnover to a negative value in the calibration with low turnover.
Both observations are qualitatively as well as quantitatively consistent with the evidence.
The reason for the decline in the procyclicality of productivity, is the increase in the
relative volatility of employment, a result that is consistent with the data as well. These
results are robust to variations in the specication and calibration of the model, as
documented in appendix G.
Three elements in the model are crucial for these results. First, the convexity of the
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employment adjustment costs implies that hiring costs fall from 3% to around 1% of
output with the decline in labour market turnover. Second, the e¤ort choice provides
an intensive margin of adjustment for labour input. As frictions fall, it becomes optimal
to adjust labour more through employment and less through e¤ort. Thus, the volatility
of employment increases more than that of output, as the volatility of e¤ort falls.
The third element in the model that is important for the results is that uctuations in
the model are driven by two types of shocks: technology shocks and preference shocks or
labour supply shocks. In a one-shock model, the correlations between all variables would
be close to either 1 or  1.27 In addition, if uctuations were driven only by technology
shocks then productivity could never be countercyclical, since employment would only
uctuate because of changes in labour demand, and the direct e¤ect of technology on
productivity would always prevail over the indirect e¤ect of employment. It is important
to stress, however, that our results are not driven by changes in the relative importance
of both shocks, which we keep constant, but by the reduction in frictions, which changes
the response of the economy conditional on each shock.
4.6 Evidence for the Mechanism: The Cyclicality of E¤ort
Our model predicts that the volatility of e¤ort should have decreased as the volatility
of labour input increased. We use this prediction as an over-identifying restriction to
test our story. However, since it is not directly observable, we need a proxy measure for
e¤ort.
The most commonly used proxy for e¤ort is hours per worker (Basu, Fernald, and
Kimball (2006), Fernald and Wang (2016)). However, this is a valid proxy only if
adjusting hours per worker, like adjusting e¤ort in our model, is costless to rms. The
evidence suggests that there are frictions associated with adjusting work hours.28 In
27This is exactly true in a static, linear model. Our model is close to (log)linear and the version
without capital and with exible wages has only one state variable (employment), which has very fast
transition dynamics.
28While adjusting hours per worker is clearly not subject to the same frictions that a¤ect adjusting
employment, e.g. search frictions and training costs, there are other frictions that will (also) a¤ect this
intensive margin of labour adjustment, e.g. norms, other forms of status-quo bias or inattention. While
these frictions may be smaller than those a¤ecting the extensive margin, the data suggest they are
nevertheless important. In microdata, there is enormous bunchingof hours worked around 40 hours
per week. And in aggregate data, hours per worker are slower to fall in recesions and slower to recover
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fact, the standard deviation of hours per worker relative to output increases in the 80s.
This is consistent with our story if we think of hours per worker as part of the extensive
margin (labour input) rather than the intensive margin (e¤ort) in the context of our
model.
We use the injury incidence rate from the BLS as a proxy for e¤ort.29 Shea (1990)
shows that the incidence of injuries, like e¤ort in our model, is procyclical (over his
sample period, which runs until 1988), and statistically explains a large part of the excess
procyclicality of productivity. He argues that the injury rate proxies for work e¤ort and
supports this argument by showing that the procyclicality of the series survives even
when controlling for overtime and labour turnover (the leading alternatives to e¤ort
as explanations for why injuries are procyclical). The BLS still gathers statistics on
injuries as part of its Injuries, Illnesses, and Fatalities (IIF) program, and we were able
to replicate Sheas preferred series (the number of total recordable injuries per 200,000
paid hours worked) over the period 1976-2016.30 Figure 3 plots the cyclical component
of this proxy for e¤ort.
Our proxy for e¤ort is available only at annual frequency from 1976 onwards, so
that we cannot estimate the change in the volatility of e¤ort around our breakdate of
1985 (we would have only 8 observations for the pre-84 period after rst-di¤erencing).
Therefore, we use 1995 as the breakdate, which is roughly halfway the sample for the
injury rate. We start by showing that the changes in the business cycle dynamics of
labour productivity and employment around this breakdate are similar to those in our
baseline sample, and then complete the picture by documenting that the volatility of
e¤ort fell at the same time.
Panels A and B in table 5 re-documents our basic stylised facts using annual data
in booms even than employment (van Rens (2012)). Chetty (2012) shows that even relatively small
frictions may have a large e¤ect on the elasticity of labour supply, because the utility loss of deviations
from the optimal hours worked is relatively modest, which may explain why the literature trying to
estimate this elasticity, surveyed in Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012), has found values close to zero.
29We are grateful to Evi Pappa for this suggestion.
30The industry-level data are only consistent over the subperiods 1976-1988, 1989-2001, 2002, 2003-
2013, and 2014-2016. However, we were able to nd aggregate rates for the private manufacturing sector
that are consistent over the entire period. We also constructed a few alternative series (only injuries
that led to lost workdays, as suggested by Shea as an alternative, and the same two series for injuries
and illnesses combined), but the period, for which we were able to obtain these data is much shorter.
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over the 1977-2016 period. Since the Great Moderation happened well before 1995, the
volatility of employment is roughly constant in this period. However, the vanishing
procyclicality of labour productivity and the rising volatility of employment relative
to output are clearly visible. In fact, the decline in the correlation of productivity
with output and employment and the increase in the relative standard deviation of
employment are surprisingly similar to these estimates in our baseline sample for the
1948-2015 period, and are still signicant at the 10% level, although the standard errors
are of course much larger than in the longer quarterly sample.
Panel C in table 5 shows the absolute and relative standard deviations of the injury
incidence rate, as a proxy for e¤ort. The volatility of e¤ort fall dramatically and sig-
nicantly, both in absolute terms and relative to the volatility of output. This nding
is robust for all three lters that we used throughout this paper as well as to changes
in the breakdate. Since we did not target this statistic in our simulations, we take the
falling volatility of e¤ort as strong evidence in favor of the mechanism we put forward
in this paper.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we documented two changes in labour market dynamics over the postwar
period in the US: the strong procyclicality of labour productivity has vanished, and the
volatility of employment has increased with respect to output. From the vantage point
of the early 80s, the procyclicality of labour productivity was a well established empirical
fact. This observation lent support to business cycle theories that assigned a central role
to technology shocks as a source of uctuations. The relative volatility of labour input
in these models was lower than in the data, which posed one of the main challenges for
these models, see King and Rebelo (1999) or Hall (1997). From todays perspective,
things look distinctly worse for real business cycle theory. The relative volatility of
labour input increased even further and productivity is now barely procyclical or may
even be countercyclical.
We presented a model to argue that these changes might be explained by the US
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labour market having become more exible. The intuition for why a decline in labour
market turnover increases the relative volatility of employment and reduces the pro-
cyclicality of labour productivity is straightforward and compelling. If employment
adjustment costs are convex, then lower turnover implies lower hiring costs. If there is
another input into production that can be used at least partly as a substitute for labour,
then a reduction in hiring frictions will make that input less volatile, so that employ-
ment becomes more volatile with respect to output. In this paper, we refer to this other
factor input as e¤ort, but a very similar argument can be made for capacity utilization
of capital. Given that capital does not uctuate much at business cycle frequencies,
the fact that the comovement of labour and output and therefore labour productivity
has changed almost unavoidably leads to the conclusion that there must be another
input into the production process.
Around the same time that the procyclicality of productivity vanished, there were
other changes in US business cycle dynamics, perhaps most notably the reduction in
output volatility (Stock and Watson (2002)) and the emergence of the slow recoveries
(Galí, Smets, and Wouters (2012)). A reduction in volatility or an increase in persistence
across all macroeconomic aggregates does not a¤ect the business cycle statistics we
focused on in this paper. However, some have argued that the slow recoveries are
jobless, in the sense that they are associated with a slower response of employment
to changes in output (Bachmann (2012), Jaimovich and Siu (2018)). If this is the case,
then this change would tend to make labour productivity more procyclical. We therefore
do not believe the possible emergence of jobless recoveries is related to the vanishing
procyclicality of productivity.
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Table 1. The Vanishing Procyclicality of Labour Productivity
Corr with output Corr with labour input
Pre-84 Post-85 Change Pre-84 Post-85 Change
Output per hour
BP 0:63 0:07  0:56 0:23  0:43  0:66
[0:05] [0:08] [0:10] [0:08] [0:07] [0:11]
4D 0:65 0:18  0:47 0:18  0:42  0:60
[0:05] [0:09] [0:10] [0:07] [0:09] [0:11]
HP 0:64  0:09  0:73 0:21  0:56  0:77
[0:05] [0:09] [0:10] [0:07] [0:06] [0:10]
Output per worker
BP 0:78 0:50  0:27 0:29  0:13  0:42
[0:03] [0:07] [0:07] [0:08] [0:09] [0:12]
4D 0:77 0:44  0:33 0:19  0:20  0:39
[0:03] [0:08] [0:09] [0:07] [0:12] [0:14]
HP 0:77 0:31  0:46 0:24  0:30  0:54
[0:03] [0:09] [0:09] [0:07] [0:09] [0:11]
Standard errors in brackets are calculated from the variance-covariance matrix of the
second moments using the delta method. Data are from the BLS labour productivity and
cost program (LPC) and refer to the private sector (non-farm business sector). Labour
input is total hours worked in the rst panel and employment in the second panel,
consistent with the denition of labour productivity. The sample period is 1948-2015.
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Table 2. The Rising Volatility of Labour Input
Std. Dev. Relative Std. Dev.
Pre-84 Post-85 Ratio Pre-84 Post-85 Ratio
Hours (private sector)
BP 2:02 1:53 0:76 0:80 1:10 1:38
[0:10] [0:09] [0:06] [0:03] [0:05] [0:08]
4D 3:05 2:45 0:80 0:77 1:08 1:40
[0:16] [0:27] [0:10] [0:03] [0:06] [0:10]
HP 2:04 1:78 0:87 0:79 1:20 1:52
[0:10] [0:10] [0:07] [0:03] [0:05] [0:09]
Employment (private sector)
BP 1:66 1:20 0:72 0:66 0:87 1:33
[0:08] [0:07] [0:06] [0:03] [0:05] [0:10]
4D 2:58 2:06 0:80 0:65 0:92 1:41
[0:13] [0:23] [0:10] [0:03] [0:06] [0:11]
HP 1:72 1:46 0:85 0:66 1:00 1:51
[0:09] [0:08] [0:07] [0:03] [0:06] [0:11]
Standard errors in brackets are calculated from the variance-covariance matrix of the
second moments using the delta method. Data are from the BLS labour productivity
and cost program (LPC) and refer to the private sector (non-farm business sector). The
sample period is 1948-2015.
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Table 3. Model Calibration
Parameter Target
Utility:  = 0:99 quarterly data
 = 1 log utility over consumption
 = 1:24 frictionless employment population ratio N = 0:7
Production: f (N) = N1 ,  = 1=3 capital share
E¤ort:  = 0:299 normalization: frictionless E = 1
 = 0 normalization so that E is in utils
 = 0:3 total curvature +  is a free parameter
Frictions:  = 0:35  0:20 gross quarterly separations, decline in turnover
g (H) = 1+H
1+;  = 1:5 convex adjustment costs
 = 3:19 frictions 3% of output pre-84
Shocks: A = 0:97; A = 0:186 normalization: sd(y) = 1%
z = 0:97, z = 0:173 sd(n) =sd(y) = 0:66
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Table 4. Simulation results
frictions empl/pop correlation productivity relative std.dev. std.dev.
(% GDP) ratio N with output with empl empl nt wage wt output yt
Data
Pre-84 0:78 0:29 0:66 0:30
Post-85 0:50  0:13 0:87 0:88
Model
 = 0:40 3:69 0:52 0:79 0:10 0:61 0:87 1:00
 = 0:35 (Pre) 3:00 0:56 0:75 0:01 0:66 0:88 1:00
 = 0:30 2:30 0:59 0:71  0:08 0:71 0:88 1:00
 = 0:25 1:63 0:62 0:66  0:17 0:76 0:88 1:01
 = 0:20 (Post) 1:02 0:65 0:61  0:24 0:82 0:88 1:01
 = 0:15 0:53 0:67 0:57  0:30 0:86 0:87 1:02
Frictionless 0:00 0:70 0:48  0:39 0:95 0:85 1:04
Moments for the model are based on simulated time series of 200; 000 quarters. We
simulate the model for 201; 000 quarters but ignore the rst 1; 000 quarters to eliminate
the e¤ect of the initial conditions. Numbers in bold are calibration targets.
40
Table 5. Changes in Labour Market Dynamics 1977-2016
A. The Vanishing Procyclicality of Labour Productivity
Corr with output Corr with labour input
Pre-94 Post-95 Change Pre-94 Post-95 Change
BP 0:80 0:38  0:42 0:39  0:17  0:56
[0:11] [0:17] [0:20] [0:24] [0:26] [0:35]
FD 0:60 0:32  0:28  0:01  0:29  0:28
[0:14] [0:17] [0:22] [0:23] [0:18] [0:29]
HP 0:61 0:14  0:47 0:09  0:34  0:44
[0:18] [0:19] [0:27] [0:23] [0:18] [0:29]
B. The Rising Volatility of Labour Input
Std. Dev. Relative Std. Dev.
Pre-94 Post-95 Ratio Pre-94 Post-95 Ratio
BP 1:15 1:24 1:08 0:65 0:94 1:44
[0:14] [0:14] [0:18] [0:09] [0:11] [0:27]
FD 2:15 2:09 0:97 0:80 0:99 1:24
[0:27] [0:57] [0:29] [0:11] [0:10] [0:21]
HP 2:28 2:30 1:01 0:80 1:05 1:32
[0:27] [0:28] [0:17] [0:13] [0:10] [0:25]
C. The Falling Volatility of E¤ort
Std. Dev. Relative Std. Dev.
Pre-94 Post-95 Ratio Pre-94 Post-95 Ratio
BP 0:26 0:15 0:57 0:15 0:11 0:77
[0:03] [0:02] [0:12] [0:02] [0:01] [0:15]
FD 0:58 0:26 0:45 0:21 0:12 0:58
[0:10] [0:03] [0:10] [0:04] [0:03] [0:18]
HP 0:74 0:20 0:27 0:26 0:09 0:35
[0:08] [0:03] [0:05] [0:03] [0:01] [0:07]
Standard errors in brackets are calculated from the variance-covariance matrix of the
second-moments using the delta method. Labour productivity is output per worker and
labour input is employment. The proxy for e¤ort is the injury incidence rate from the
BLS Injuries, Illnesses, and Fatalities (IIF) program, as in Shea (1988). Data are annual
and the sample period is 1977-2016.
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Figure 1. The Vanishing Procyclicality of Labour Productivity
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Figure 2. The Vanishing Procyclicality of Labour Productivity: Rolling Correlations
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Correlations are calculated in a centered 8-year rolling window of quarterly bandpass-
ltered data.
42
Figure 3. The Cyclicality of E¤ort
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worked) in the US. Annual data ltered with bandpass lter (blue solid), rst di¤er-
ences (red dash) and Hodrick-Prescott (green dash-dot) lter. Shaded areas are NBER
recessions.
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1
A Additional Business Cycle Statistics for the US
Table 6. Additional Business Cycle Statistics
A. Volatility output and productivity
Std. Dev. Relative Std. Dev.
Pre-84 Post-85 Ratio Pre-84 Post-85 Ratio
Output
BP 2:53 1:39 0:55
[0:13] [0:09] [0:05]
4D 3:95 2:26 0:57
[0:20] [0:28] [0:08]
HP 2:59 1:48 0:57
[0:14] [0:10] [0:05]
Output per worker
BP 1:49 0:85 0:57 0:59 0:62 1:05
[0:08] [0:05] [0:05] [0:03] [0:05] [0:10]
4D 2:54 1:41 0:55 0:64 0:62 0:97
[0:13] [0:08] [0:04] [0:03] [0:08] [0:13]
HP 1:57 0:90 0:57 0:61 0:60 1:00
[0:08] [0:07] [0:05] [0:03] [0:05] [0:10]
B. Correlations
Corr with output Corr with employment
Pre-84 Post-85 Change Pre-84 Post-85 Change
Employment (private sector)
BP 0:83 0:79  0:03
[0:02] [0:03] [0:04]
4D 0:78 0:79 0:02
[0:03] [0:05] [0:06]
HP 0:81 0:82 0:01
[0:03] [0:03] [0:04]
Standard errors in brackets are calculated from the variance-covariance matrix of the second
moments using the delta method. See tables 1 and 2 for data sources and sample period.
2
B The Cyclicality of Productivity across Industries and
Countries
B.1 Evidence from Industry-level Data
We use data on industry productivity from the BLS labour productivity and cost pro-
gram,31 also known as the US KLEMS data, and drop the sectors agriculture and gov-
ernment in order to focus on the non-farm business sector. This gives us annual data
on output per hour, output per worker, output, hours worked and employment for 49
industries at the 3-digit level over the 1987-2016 period. To make the data stationary,
we take (annual) rst di¤erences.
The time period for which industry-level data are available is di¤erent from the
period we use for aggregate data in the main text. This is not a big problem, because
here we are interested in cross-sectional correlations in business cycle statistics. In order
to control for xed industry characteristics, we arbitrarily split the sample in half, and
consider the variation in changes in these statistics between the 1987-1999 and 2000-
2016 periods across industries. The patterns we document look very similar if we use
the level of these statistics instead.
Figure 4 plots the change in the cyclicality of labour productivity against the change
in the relative volatility of labour input. The cyclicality of productivity is measured
as the correlation between output per worker and output, and the relative volatility of
labour is measured as the relative standard deviation of employment with respect to
output. The graph looks very similar if we use total hours worked as the measure of
labour input, and if we measure the cyclicality of productivity as its correlation with
labour.
Industries that experienced a larger decline in the procyclicality of productivity (or
a smaller increase in procyclicality) on average also experienced a larger increase in the
relative volatility of labour input (or smaller decrease). This nding is consistent with
our hypothesis that the vanishing procyclicality of labour productivity and the rising
relative volatility of labour input are related, in the sense that they are both the result
of the US labour market becoming more exible.
31https://www.bls.gov/lpc/
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Figure 4. Changes in Labour Market Dynamics across Industries, 1987-2016
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All series are in annual rst-di¤erences and refer to the non-farm business sector. Data
were taken from the industry-level database of the BLS labour productivity and cost
program. Labels refer to 3-digit NAICS numbers.
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B.2 International Evidence
Although in this paper we focus on the US, it is worth exploring whether the same
patterns hold for other countries as well. For many countries, data are not available
for our sample period. However, Ohanian and Ra¤o (2012) collected data on output,
employment and hours worked from the OECD Economic Outlook database and national
statistics o¢ ces, for many countries starting from 1960. Table 7 reports the cyclicality
of labour productivity and the relative volatility of labour input for the four major
European economies using these data. For comparison, we also report the statistics for
the US over the same period.
The change in labour market dynamics in the US is much more pronounced than in
almost all other countries. In fact, the drop in the procyclicality of labour productivity
in the US looks even more dramatic over the 1960-2013 period than over our baseline
period (1948-2015). In the majority of other countries, the procyclicality of labour
productivity decreases much less, or even increases slightly. Notable exceptions are
Spain, and to a lesser degree also Ireland, Sweden and perhaps Norway and the UK,
where the procyclicality of labour productivity also declined substantially.
Next, we look at the change in labour market turnover in these countries, using
international time series data for worker ows calculated by Elsby, Hobijn, and S¸ahin
(2013). Unfortunately, for most countries these data start only in 1983, so that the best
we can do is to compare the 1985-90 period to the 2002-2007 period. These statistics
are reported in (the left-hand side panel of) Table 8.
The US is the country with by far the largest decline in the separation rate, followed
at a distance by Ireland. Other countries not only experience a much smaller (or no)
decline in turnover, but the level of the separation rate is much lower as well, which
with quadratic adjustment costs implies that even for the same decline in turnover
the e¤ect on frictions would be much smaller. Therefore, in light of the explanation we
propose in this paper, it should not be surprising that labour productivity became much
less procyclical in the US, whereas there was no such change in many other countries.
Finally, how is it possible that the dynamics of productivity, output and employment
in Spain (and Sweden, Norway and the UK) changed as much as it did, whereas there
is no evidence for a decline in labour market turnover in these countries? We argue the
reason is simply that there were other changes than the separation rate a¤ecting labour
market frictions. The decline in turnover may have been the main driver of the reduction
in labour market frictions in the US, but other countries, like Spain, experienced a huge
liberalization of the labour market over this period, which reduced frictions for entirely
di¤erent reasons. Comparing the OECD employment protection index for the same
countries and the same time periods as the separation rates (right-hand side panel of
Table 8), we see that Spain is with distance the country that experienced the greatest
change in employment protection.
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Table 7. Changes in Labour Market Dynamics in European and other OECD
Countries, 1960-2013
Correlation Productivity Relative Std. Dev.
with output with employment employment
Pre-84 Post-85 Change Pre-84 Post-85 Change Pre-84 Post-85 Ratio
US, baseline 0:78 0:60  0:18 0:31  0:15  0:47 0:66 0:81 1:23
US, OR 0:76 0:48  0:28 0:25  0:20  0:45 0:67 0:90 1:33
Austria 0:83 0:86 0:02  0:15 0:34 0:49 0:56 0:55 0:99
Finland 0:68 0:73 0:05  0:25  0:08 0:17 0:76 0:69 0:91
France 0:93 0:85  0:08 0:42 0:31  0:11 0:40 0:56 1:38
Germany 0:86 0:92 0:07 0:31 0:28  0:02 0:54 0:40 0:74
Ireland 0:87 0:61  0:26  0:17  0:33  0:16 0:50 0:84 1:66
Italy 0:93 0:82  0:11 0:35 0:02  0:33 0:40 0:58 1:43
Norway 0:87 0:58  0:29  0:41  0:43  0:02 0:53 0:90 1:70
Spain (1961-) 0:72  0:06  0:78  0:25  0:57  0:31 0:47 1:20 2:54
Sweden 0:83 0:64  0:19 0:01  0:19  0:20 0:55 0:78 1:42
UK 0:92 0:81  0:11  0:05  0:10  0:04 0:40 0:59 1:49
Australia (1964-) 0:65 0:50  0:15  0:34  0:57  0:23 0:73 1:04 1:43
Canada 0:44 0:83 0:40  0:27 0:21 0:48 0:94 0:56 0:60
Japan 0:95 0:96 0:02 0:16 0:34 0:18 0:32 0:29 0:89
Korea (1970-) 0:93 0:80  0:13  0:03 0:40 0:44 0:35 0:65 1:85
All data are bandpass ltered and refer to the private sector. Data for the baseline
results for the US are from the BLS labour productivity and cost program (LPC), see
Tables 1, 2 and 3 for details. Data for all other countries were collected by Ohanian
and Ra¤o (2012) from the OECD Economic Outlook database and national statistics
o¢ ces. For consistency with our baseline results, productivity is real output per worker
and employment is in persons, although the Ohanian-Ra¤o data also allow to calculate
output per hour and total hours.
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Table 8. Changes in Labour Market Institutions in European and other OECD
Countries, 1985-2007
Separation rate Employment protection
1985-90 2002-07 Change Ratio 1985-90 2002-07 Change Ratio
US 3:8 2:9  0:9 0:76 25:7 25:7 0:0 1:00
Austria 275:0 244:5  30:5 0:89
Finland 278:6 216:7  61:9 0:78
France 0:8 0:8 0:0 1:00 242:4 244:3 1:8 1:01
Germany 0:4 0:6 0:2 1:41 258:3 279:3 21:0 1:08
Ireland 0:7 0:4  0:3 0:56 143:7 140:4  3:3 0:98
Italy 0:4 0:4 0:0 1:11 276:2 276:2 0:0 1:00
Norway 1:2 1:8 0:6 1:47 233:3 233:3 0:0 1:00
Spain 0:9 0:9 0:0 0:99 354:8 235:7  119:1 0:66
Sweden 0:8 1:4 0:7 1:84 279:8 260:7  19:1 0:93
UK 0:9 0:9 0:0 1:11 103:2 119:8 16:6 1:16
Australia 1:7 1:8 0:1 1:04 116:7 141:7 25:0 1:21
Canada 2:3 2:5 0:2 1:09 92:1 92:1 0:0 1:00
Japan 0:5 0:8 0:2 1:44 170:2 170:2 0:0 1:00
Korea 236:9
Data for the separation rate are from Elsby, Hobijn, and S¸ahin (2013). Employment
protection is the EPRC index (version 1) from the OECD. The begin and end year of
the sample were chosen to obtain consistent results for both the separation rates and
the employment protection index for as many countries as possible, while spanning a
time period that is as close as possible to the results on labour market dynamics. The
EHS start in 1983 for most countries, and run to 2007. Data on employment protection
run from 1985 to 2013. The index is very persistent over time, so changing the end year
of the sample makes very little di¤erence.
7
C Marginal Product and Disutility of E¤ort
This appendix derives the marginal product of employment to the rm, equation (12),
and the marginal disutility from employment, expressed in consumption terms, to the
household, equation (16), if e¤ort adjusts endogenously. From equations (4) and (2), it
is straightforward di¤erentation to decompose the total e¤ect of employment on output
and total e¤ective labour supply into a direct e¤ect and an e¤ect through the endogenous
response of e¤ort.
dYjt
dNjt
=
@Yjt
@Njt
+
@Yjt
@Ejt
@Ejt
@Njt
=
(1  )Yjt
Njt

1 +  
Njt
Ejt
@Ejt
@Njt

(36)
dLht
dNht
=
@Lht
@Nht
+
@Lht
@Eht
@Eht
@Nht
=
1
1 + 

1 + E1+ht

1 + (1 + )
Nht
Eht
@Eht
@Nht

(37)
Here, Ejt denotes the e¤ort of all workers i that are employed in rm j and Eht the e¤ort
of all workers that are members of household h.
To nd the response of e¤ort to changes in employment that rm and household
face, we use the condition that the marginal disutility from e¤ort of a given worker
i (expressed in consumption terms) from equation (8), in equilibrium must equal the
marginal productivity of that worker to the rm from equation (9).
E1+  it =
 (1 + )
(1 + ) 
Zt
Cht
(1  )At
Z Njt
0
E vtdv
 
(38)
First, suppose rm j considers employing Njt workers, given that all other rms
employ the equilibrium number of workers Nt. Because there are innitely many rms,
rm js decision to employ Njt 66= Nt workers does not a¤ect the fraction of household hs
members that are employed, so that by the assumption of perfect risk-sharing within the
household, the consumption of workers in rm j is not a¤ected, Cht = Ct. Substituting
this, as well as the condition that all workers in rm j exert the same amount of e¤ort,
Eit = Ejt for all i 2 [0; Njt], the e¤ort condition becomes,
E1+  jt =
 (1 + )
(1 + ) 
Zt
Ct
(1  )At

E jtNjt
 
(39)
so that the elasticity of e¤ort in a given rm j with respect to employment in that rm,
is given by
Njt
Ejt
@Ejt
@Njt
=   
1 +   (1  ) (40)
Substituting this elasticity into equation (36) above, gives expression (12) in the text.
Next, suppose household h considers having Nht employed workers, given that all
other households have Nt employed workers. Because there are innitely many house-
holds, households hs decision to have a fraction of Nht 66= Nt of its members employed,
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does not a¤ect the level of employment in any rm Njt = Nt. Furthermore, although
the e¤ort level of worker i may change because of household hs decision, e¤ort of all
other workers in rm j, who are members of di¤erent households, is una¤ected, Eit = Eht
and Ei0t = Et for i0 6= i. Thus, the e¤ort condition becomes,
E1+  ht =
 (1 + )
(1 + ) 
Zt
Cht
(1  )At

E t Nt
 
(41)
and the elasticity of e¤ort exerted by members of household h with respect to employ-
ment in that household, using equation (3), is given by,
Nht
Eht
@Eht
@Nht
=
Cht
Eht
@Eht
@Cht
 Nht
Cht
@Cht
@Nht
=   
1 +    
WhtNht
Cht
=   
1 +    (42)
Substituting this elasticity into equation (37) above, gives expression (16) in the text.
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D The Information Channel and the Decline in Labour
Market Turnover
To see how the information channel reduces labour maket turnover and hiring frictions
in an extension of our model, we make the following assumptions, following Mercan
(2017), in addition to the assumptions in section 3.
 There is an idiosyncratic component of productivity  2 fG; Bg, so that match
productivity equals At, which is unobservable. The (objective) probability that
 = G is pG, and we normalise pGG + (1  pG)B = 1 so that aggregate pro-
ductivity is still At.
 Workers and rms receive signals about , and based on these signals form their
belief p0  G (p0jp) about the probability that  = G, where p is the belief before
the last signal. These beliefs are formed through normal Bayesian learning.
 At the start of a match, n signals are received immediately, based on which worker
and rm form their initial belief p0  G (p0jp) that their prospective match will be
highly productive.
Note that the assumption of normal Bayesian learning with two possible outcomes gives
closed-form expressions for p0 as a function of p and output, as well as for the distribu-
tions G (p0) and G (p0jp), see section 3.4 in Mercan (2017).
With these additional assumptions, job creation condition (13) becomes
g0 (Ht) =
Z 1
0
max


0; SFt (p0)

dG (p0) (43)
where the max operator captures that some matches are not created because the prior
belief that match is of good quality is too low. Firm surplus SFt (p), as in equation (14),
is now given by
SFt (p) = (1 	F ) (pG + (1  p)B)
(1  )Yt
Nt
 Wt (p)
+ (1  )Et

Qt;t+1
Z 1
0
max


0; SFt+1
 
p0

dG
 
p0jp (44)
Here, the max operator captures endogenous match destruction if beliefs about match
quality become too low.32
32To close the model, i.e. in order to solve for the wage, we also need to modify the equation for
household surplus, as in equation (17), as follows.
SHt (p) = Wt (p)  1
1 + 
Ct
Zt
 	H (pG + (1  p)B)
(1  )Yt
Nt
+ (1  )Et

Qt;t+1
Z 1
0
max
D
0; SHt+1
 
p0
E
dG
 
p0jp (45)
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Better information about prospective job matches due to improved search technolo-
gies is modeled as an increase in n, the number of signals about match quality that
worker and rm receive prior to deciding whether or not to form a match. An increase
in n reduces the the variance of p0, because prior beliefs are based on more informa-
tion and therefore more accurate, and p0jp, because there is less learning and updating
of beliefs after a larger number of signals has already been received, see section 3.4.3
in Mercan (2017) for a proof using the expressions for normal Bayesian learning. By
equation (44), a lower variance of p0jp implies a reduction in job destruction. The e¤ect
of this reduction in turnover on (un)employment is counteracted by a reduction in job
creation due to the lower variance of p0, see equation (43), which implies that some
(relatively low quality) matches are not created.
Further extending the model allows to match a wider set of statistics in the data.
Importantly, by adding on-the-job search the model generates predictions about the
EE ow, and by adding wage renegotiation based on outside o¤ers, it generates realistic
wage proles as well. Mercan (2017) uses this extended model to show that the improved
information story described here can match at least half of the observed decline in the EE
ow, as well as wage growth for job switchers, whereas competing stories, in particular
decline in the e¢ ciency of on-the-job search, cannot.
Quantitatively, improved information cannot explain the entire observed decline in
the separation rate. In Mercans calibration, the model predicts a decline in the sepa-
ration rate from 2:0 to 1:8%, only 10% of the observed drop from 4:0 to 2:0%.33 It is
possible that the predicted decline is larger once costs from moving from job to job are
taken into account (Mercan, private conversation).
However, this expression is not needed to understand the intuition for the mechanism. All other equations
of our model remain unchanged.
33We are grateful to Yusuf Mercan for providing these numbers, which are not (yet) in the publicly
available version of the paper.
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E Intuition for the Main Result
We can use the job creation condition to get a better intuition for this mechanism. For
simplicity, we rst write the job creation condition in terms of total match surplus.
Substituting (21) into (18), we get
g0 (Ht) = WUBt  Wt = 12
 
WUBt  WLBt
  12St (46)
and combining (19) and (20) gives an expression for total match surplus St
St = (1 	F  	H) (1  )Yt
Nt
  1
1 + 
Ct
Zt
+ (1  )Et [Qt;t+1St+1] (47)
Since the link between turnover and frictions is unrelated to e¤ort or preference shocks,
we simplify further by assuming away these elements of the model, setting  = 0 so that
	F = 	H = 0,  = 0 and Zt = 0, as well as assuming linear utility over consumption,
 = 0. Then, the expression for match surplus simplies to,
St = pt    + (1  )Et [St+1] (48)
where pt = (1  )Yt=Nt. This is a standard job creation condition found in many
labour market models. Finally, assuming that productivity pt is close to a random
walk (or, alternatively, that surplus St is in steady state in each period), we get that
approximately
St = Et
1X
s=0
s (1  )s

(1  )Yt+s
Nt+s
  

' 1 + r
r + 

(1  )Yt
Nt
  

(49)
where r = (1  ) =.
In the absence of other shocks, a good measure for the volatility of hiring relative
to productivity is the elasticity of Ht with respect to pt. This steady state elastic-
ity (Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005)) can be
calculated by log-linearizing equations (46) and (49)
d logHt
d log pt
=
Hg00
 
H

g0
 
H
 d logSt
d log pt
=
Hg00
 
H

g0
 
H
 p
p   (50)
Assuming that g (:) is an iso-elastic function, g (H) = 1+H
1+, Hg00
 
H

=g0
 
H

=  is
constant, so that the only way in which a decline in  can increase the relative volatility
of hiring with respect to productivity is through a reduction in steady state match
surplus p  , as you suspected.
To see how  a¤ects match surplus, we need to solve out for the steady state of
the model. Combining the steady state version of JCC, g0
 
H

= 12
S = 12
1+r
r+ [p  ],
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with the denition of productivity and the production function, p = (1  ) Y = N =
(1  ) A N , and the law of motion for employment, Nt = (1  )Nt 1 +Ht )  N =
H, we get an expression for the steady state level of hiring
(1  ) A
 H

 
   = 2r + 
1 + r
H (51)
There are two e¤ects of  on H. First, assuming  = 0 (constant marginal hiring costs, as
in the standard search model), a lower  unambiguously reduces hiring one-for-one. This
is the turnover e¤ect: a lower separation rate implies less replacement hiring. Second,
for  > 0 (convex adjustment costs), there is a counteracting e¤ect: lower  implies
more hiring because marginal hiring costs are lower. However, this e¤ect never o¤sets
the direct e¤ect.
Match surplus, by the steady state JCC, depends on  both directly and through
the steady state level of hiring, which a¤ects marginal hiring cost.
p   = 2r + 
1 + r
g0
 
H

(52)
The direct e¤ect of a decline in  is to lower surplus and thus to amplify the relative
volatility of hiring. This goes in the direction or our story. The indirect e¤ect is what
we mean when we write that the decline in turnover decreased hiring frictions, because
adjustment costs in employment are convex: a lower  reduces H which reduces g0
 
H

and therefore surplus, also amplifying the relative volatility of hiring.
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F Calibration: Quarterly versus Weekly Frequency
We simulate the model at quarterly frequency, as is common in the business cycle litera-
ture. In order to incorporate a frictionless labour market as a special case of our model,
we make a timing assumption, following Blanchard and Galí (2010), that workers that
are separated may nd another job within the quarter, see equation (6). Given that
median unemployment duration in the US is around 10 weeks, i.e. much less than a
quarter, any other assumption would impose unrealistic frictions on the model. In this
appendix we explain some of the technical details associated with this assumption, and
show that it does not greatly a¤ect our results.
F.1 Calculation Quarterly Gross Separation Probability
Our timing assumption raises an issue how to calibrate the gross separation or employ-
ment exit probability , which is the fractions of jobs that are destroyed in a quarter.
Empirical measures based on worker surveys, like the CPS, tend to give the net sepa-
ration or employment exit probability s, i.e. the probability that an employed worker
who is employed at the beginning of the quarter is no longer employed at the end of
the quarter. The di¤erence between the two is that gross separations also include those
workers who after losing their job nd another job within the quarter. In order to trans-
late the net employment exit probability into a gross employment exit probability, we
use a comparable measure for the employment inow probability. In a 2-state labour
market model, this measure is the unemployment outow or job nding probability f .
Shimer (2012) provides measures of s and f from the CPS, at monthly frequency.
A second issue arises how to aggregate the monthly measures to quarterly prob-
abilities. In the search literature, the solution is often to circumvent this problem by
simulating the model at monthly or even weekly frequency, so that probabilities are close
to Poisson arrival rates and within-period transitions may be ignored. In this paper,
we instead follow the custom in the business cycle literature and simulate our model
at quarterly frequency. We aggregate monthly probabilities sm and fm into quarterly
ones by assuming a 2-state model of the labour market, in which workers may be ei-
ther employed or unemployed (or non-employed). Under this assumption, the quarterly
probabilities sq and fq can simply be calculated as the sum of the probabilities of all
possible within period transitions.
Let uq and eq denote the end of quarter q labour market state unemployed and
employed, respectively, and let u1;q, u2;q, u3;q and e1;q, e2;q, e3;q denote unemployment
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or employment in months 1, 2 and 3 of quarter q. Then,
sq = P [uq jeq 1 ]  P [eq 1uq] (53)
= P [e3;q 1u1;qu2;qu3;q] + P [e3;q 1e1;qu2;qu3;q] + P [e3;q 1e1;qe2;qu3;q] + P [e3;q 1u1;qe2;qu3;q](54)
= sm (1  fm)2 + (1  sm) sm (1  fm) + (1  sm)2 sm + smfmsm (55)
and similarly
fq = P [eq juq 1 ]  P [uq 1eq] (56)
= P [u3;q 1e1;qe2;qe3;q] + P [u3;q 1u1;qe2;qe3;q] + P [u3;q 1u1;qu2;qe3;q] + P [u3;q 1e1;qu2;qe3;q](57)
= fm (1  sm)2 + (1  fm) fm (1  sm) + (1  fm)2 fm + fmsmfm (58)
Once we have the quarterly net probabilities, we can calculate the gross quarterly sep-
aration probability as
 =
sq
1  fq (59)
to include those workers who after losing their job nd another job within the quarter.
F.2 Robustness of the Simulations
To make sure our results do not depend on the choice of the time period, we re-do our
baseline simulations at monthly frequency.
We start with simulating the model at quarterly frequency, as in the benchmark. In
the main text, we rounded the quarterly gross separation probabilities in the pre- and
post-85 period to 0:35 and 0:20. Using monthly probabilities sm = 0:04 and 0:02 and
fm = 0:45, the exact values for the quarterly gross separation rate using equations (59),
(55) and (56) are 0:34801 and 0:19567 in the pre-84 and post-85 periods, respectively.
Recalibrating all other parameters to match the same targets as in the main text, our
benchmark quarterly simulation results are summarised in the table below.
frictions empl/pop correlation productivity relative std.dev. std.dev.
(% GDP) ratio N with output with empl empl nt wage wt output yt
 = 0:3480 (Pre) 3:00 0:56 0:75 0:01 0:66 0:88 1:00
 = 0:1957 (Post) 0:99 0:65 0:61  0:25 0:82 0:87 1:01
 = 0 0:00 0:70 0:48  0:39 0:95 0:85 1:04
These results are basically the same as those in table 4 in the main text, i.e. the rounding
makes very little di¤erence.
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The monthly gross separation probabilities by (59) in the pre-84 and post-85 periods
are 0:07273 and 0:03636. We also simulated the model at the monthly frequency, using
these values for . To make the calibration consistent with the monthly frequency,
we recalibrated the discount factor  = exp
 
1
3 ln(0:99)

= 0:9967, the autocorrelation
of the shocks A = z = exp
 
1
3 ln(0:97)

= 0:9899, the standard deviations of the
shocks A and z to
q
1
3 of the quarterly variances, and recalibrated the importance of
hiring frictions  so that hiring costs are 3% of output, as in the quarterly benchmark
simulations. All other parameters were left unchanged. We then simulated the model for
600; 000 instead of 200; 000 periods, and aggregated the monthly simulations to quarterly
by keeping every third time period. This last step reduces the autocorrelations, as we
would expect, but does not a¤ect the statistics of interest (relative standard deviations
and correlations). The results are summarised in the table below.
frictions empl/pop correlation productivity relative std.dev. std.dev.
(% GDP) ratio N with output with empl empl nt wage wt output yt
 = 0:07273 (Pre) 3:00 0:55 0:78 0:05 0:62 0:89 0:98
 = 0:03636 (Post) 0:77 0:66 0:62  0:25 0:81 0:89 1:00
 = 0 0:00 0:70 0:50  0:38 0:94 0:86 1:02
These monthly simulation results are not identical to the quarterly simulations, but they
are very similar and economically no di¤erent.
We argued above that our timing assumption makes it necessary to calibrate  to
the gross rather than the net separation probability. But as the time period becomes
shorter enough, the di¤erence decreases. Therefore, to further explore the robustness
of our results, we also simulated a version of our model with a timing assumption that
is more common in the labour search literature, which we can calibrate to the net
separation probabilities. In the modied model, equation (6) is replaced by,
Nt = (1  ) (Nt 1 +Ht) (60)
which changes rst-order condition (13) to g0 (Ht) = (1  )SFt and therefore equilib-
rium condition (18) to g0 (Ht) = (1  )
 
WUBt  Wt

. Simulating this model at the
monthly frequency, we calibrate  to 0:04 and 0:02 in the pre-84 and post-85 periods,
and again recalibrate  to match 3% of output going to hiring costs in the pre-84 period.
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frictions empl/pop correlation productivity relative std.dev. std.dev.
(% GDP) ratio N with output with empl empl nt wage wt output yt
 = 0:04 (Pre) 3:00 0:55 0:83 0:12 0:56 0:90 0:95
 = 0:02 (Post) 0:74 0:66 0:68  0:20 0:75 0:91 0:96
 = 0 0:00 0:70 0:54  0:36 0:90 0:87 0:99
The results are again very similar, even though in this case not only the calibration
target for the separation probability, but also the model equations are di¤erent.
What makes our results robust to small modications in the calibration or the model
specication, is that we always recalibrate  to match the target that hiring costs are 3%
of output in the pre-84 period. This calibration target, in combination with the convexity
of the hiring cost function, guarantees that the reduction in hiring frictions between the
pre-84 and post-85 period is always similar, regardless of the model frequency or the
calibration targets for the separation probability. By extension, if we were to use di¤erent
numbers for the monthly transition probabilities, e.g. if we were to set fm = 0:25
instead of 0:45 to reect that the non-employment state includes non-participants as
well as unemployed workers, as a referee has suggested, we would again nd very similar
results.
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G Robustness Analysis: Additional Simulation Results
Table 9. Simulation results, less convex adjustment costs (1 +  = 1:6)
frictions empl/pop correlation productivity relative std.dev. std.dev.
(% GDP) ratio N with output with empl empl nt wage wt output yt
Data
Pre-84 0:78 0:29 0:66 0:30
Post-84 0:50  0:13 0:87 0:88
Model
 = 0:40 3:60 0:60 0:76  0:05 0:65 0:89 1:01
 = 0:35 (Pre) 3:00 0:62 0:75  0:09 0:66 0:90 1:00
 = 0:30 2:42 0:63 0:74  0:13 0:67 0:90 1:00
 = 0:25 1:86 0:65 0:73  0:17 0:69 0:91 0:99
 = 0:20 (Post) 1:33 0:66 0:72  0:20 0:70 0:91 0:99
 = 0:15 0:86 0:68 0:72  0:23 0:72 0:91 0:99
 = 0 0:00 0:70 0:74  0:26 0:70 0:93 0:96
18
Table 10. Simulation results, less convex adjustment costs (quadratic)
frictions empl/pop correlation productivity relative std.dev. std.dev.
(% GDP) ratio N with output with empl empl nt wage wt output yt
Data
Pre-84 0:78 0:29 0:66 0:30
Post-84 0:50  0:13 0:87 0:88
Model
 = 0:40 3:66 0:57 0:78 0:02 0:63 0:88 1:01
 = 0:35 (Pre) 3:00 0:59 0:75  0:05 0:66 0:88 1:00
 = 0:30 2:35 0:61 0:73  0:11 0:69 0:89 1:00
 = 0:25 1:73 0:64 0:71  0:16 0:72 0:89 1:00
 = 0:20 (Post) 1:16 0:66 0:68  0:21 0:75 0:90 0:99
 = 0:15 0:68 0:67 0:66  0:25 0:77 0:90 0:99
 = 0 0:00 0:70 0:66  0:25 0:77 0:90 0:99
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Table 11. Simulation results, more convex adjustment costs (1 +  = 3:4)
frictions empl/pop correlation productivity relative std.dev. std.dev.
(% GDP) ratio N with output with empl empl nt wage wt output yt
Data
Pre-84 0:78 0:29 0:66 0:30
Post-84 0:50  0:13 0:87 0:88
Model
 = 0:40 3:62 0:45 0:82 0:24 0:59 0:87 0:99
 = 0:35 (Pre) 3:00 0:50 0:75 0:12 0:66 0:88 1:00
 = 0:30 2:31 0:54 0:67  0:02 0:75 0:87 1:02
 = 0:25 1:60 0:59 0:55  0:17 0:85 0:86 1:05
 = 0:20 (Post) 0:93 0:64 0:41  0:31 0:96 0:83 1:09
 = 0:15 0:41 0:67 0:28  0:42 1:06 0:80 1:13
 = 0 0:00 0:70 0:09  0:55 1:19 0:74 1:20
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Table 12. Simulation results (quadratic adjustment costs),
asymmetric Nash bargaining
frictions empl/pop correlation productivity relative std.dev. std.dev.
(% GDP) ratio N with output with empl empl nt wage wt output yt
Data
Pre-84 0:78 0:29 0:66 0:30
Post-84 0:50  0:13 0:87 0:88
Model,  = 0:2
 = 0:40 3:77 0:62 0:77  0:09 0:64 0:97 1:01
 = 0:35 (Pre) 3:00 0:64 0:76  0:13 0:66 0:96 1:00
 = 0:30 2:28 0:65 0:74  0:17 0:68 0:95 1:00
 = 0:25 1:64 0:67 0:73  0:20 0:70 0:94 1:00
 = 0:20 (Post) 1:08 0:68 0:72  0:23 0:71 0:94 1:00
 = 0:15 0:62 0:69 0:71  0:25 0:73 0:93 0:99
 = 0 0:00 0:70 0:70  0:28 0:75 0:92 0:99
Model,  = 0:7
 = 0:40 3:51 0:47 0:79 0:19 0:63 0:76 1:00
 = 0:35 (Pre) 3:00 0:50 0:76 0:10 0:66 0:77 1:00
 = 0:30 2:45 0:54 0:72 0:00 0:70 0:79 1:00
 = 0:25 1:89 0:58 0:67  0:09 0:74 0:81 1:00
 = 0:20 (Post) 1:33 0:61 0:63  0:18 0:79 0:82 1:00
 = 0:15 0:81 0:65 0:58  0:25 0:84 0:83 1:00
 = 0 0:00 0:70 0:51  0:37 0:93 0:85 1:00
Here, we use the following expression for the exible wage instead of equation (21)
W t = W
UB
t + (1  )WLBt
where  is workers bargaining power. We use values for  that are well out of the range
of values that are commonly used in the literature, to show that this parameter is not
important for our results.
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Table 13. Simulation results (quadratic adjustment costs), Frisch elasticity 0:25
frictions empl/pop correlation productivity relative std.dev. std.dev.
(% GDP) ratio N with output with empl empl nt wage wt output yt
Data
Pre-84 0:78 0:29 0:66 0:30
Post-84 0:51  0:11 0:87 0:88
Model
 = 0:40 3:76 0:64 0:77  0:07 0:64 0:96 1:00
 = 0:35 (Pre) 3:00 0:65 0:75  0:12 0:66 0:96 1:00
 = 0:30 2:29 0:66 0:74  0:16 0:68 0:95 1:00
 = 0:25 1:64 0:67 0:73  0:19 0:70 0:94 1:00
 = 0:20 (Post) 1:07 0:68 0:72  0:22 0:71 0:93 1:00
 = 0:15 0:62 0:69 0:71  0:25 0:72 0:93 1:00
 = 0 0:00 0:70 0:70  0:28 0:74 0:91 1:00
Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2012) argue based on estimates from micro-data
that the Frisch elasticity of labour supply along the extensive margin is around 0:25. In
our baseline specication, we use a utility function that is linear in labour supply, which
amounts to a Frisch elasticity of innity. To explore the robustness of our results, we
change utility function (1),
E0
1X
t=0
t
"
ZtC
1 
t
1    
L1+t
1 + 
#
where  = 0 corresponds to our baseline specication and  = 4 to a Frisch elasticity
of 0:25. This change a¤ects the e¢ ciency condition for e¤ort (11) and the Bellman
equation for worker surplus (17) and therefore the expression for the lower bound of the
bargaining set (20). In both cases, the change amounts to replacing the MRS between
consumption and leisure from Zt
Ct
to Zt
Ct L

t
, where Lt =
1+E1+t
1+ Nt is total e¤ective
labour supply. The results below are for  = 4 (and the other parameters recalibrated
as appropriate). Results are very similar to the baseline calibration.
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